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Relying on post-election surveys, we analyze how class and union membership condition voters’ abandonment of mainstream Left
parties and the alternatives chosen by former mainstream-Left voters in the period 2001–2015. Inspired by Przeworski and
Sprague’s Paper Stones (1986), our analysis shows that Left parties face a trade-off between mobilizing workers and other voters and
that unionization renders workers more loyal to Left parties that mobilize non-workers. By contrast, unionization does not render
non-workers more loyal to Left parties that mobilize workers. Union membership increases the likelihood that workers who
abandon the mainstream Left continue to vote. It also increases the likelihood that voters abandon the mainstream Left in favor of
radical Left parties rather than Center-Right parties. Finally, we show that workers are more likely to abandon mainstream Left
parties in favor of radical Right parties than non-workers and that union membership does not affect their propensity to do so. We
conclude that reversing the decline of working-class organization should be a long-term objective of mainstream Left parties.
I t is commonplace to construe recent elections in liberaldemocracies as a struggle between, on the one hand,establishment politicians and parties and, on the other hand, “populist challengers.”We focus instead on anotherconspicuous feature of recent elections: the decline ofsupport for mainstream Left parties, defined as reformist
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socialist or social-democratic parties that have histori-
cally prioritized the mobilization of working-class vot-
ers. As we document later, the vote share of mainstream
Left parties has declined in all liberal democracies since
the 1990s, often in spectacular fashion. Seeking to shed
light on this phenomenon, we present the results of two
separate analyses of election surveys. Restricted to
survey respondents who voted for the mainstream Left
in the previous election, the first analysis addresses the
question of who has abandoned the mainstream Left.
Restricted to survey respondents who voted for the
mainstream Left in the previous election but not in the
election that just occurred, the second analysis addresses
the question of where former mainstream-Left voters
have gone.
Our theoretical framework and empirical analyses are
inspired by Paper Stones, the classic 1986 book by Adam
Przeworski and John Sprague. Famously, Przeworski and
Sprague argue that reformist socialist parties face an
electoral dilemma: they need the support of middle-class
strata and other non-workers in order to obtain a parlia-
mentary majority, but they tend to loose working-class
support when they pursue supra-class strategies. Przewor-
ski and Sprague argue further that unions reinforce the
class identity of workers and thereby mitigate the electoral
dilemma of socialist parties. Following Przeworki and
Sprague, we might reasonably expect that union decline
—a pervasive trend across OECD countries over the last
twenty to thirty years (see Pontusson 2013)—renders the
trade-off between working-class and middle-class support
more severe and that this accounts for some of the electoral
difficulties that mainstream Left parties are currently
experiencing.
Adopting a broader definition of the working class
than Przeworski and Sprague’s, we estimate the class
profile of new voters for Left parties and explore how
this variable affects the propensity of workers and non-
workers—primarily middle-class voters—to abandon the
mainstream Left. To anticipate, our analysis suggests that
working-class voters are more likely to abandon Left
parties that mobilize relatively few working-class voters
and that non-workers are more likely to abandon Left
parties that primarily mobilize working-class voters. Inter-
acting union membership with the class identity of
previous voters and the class profile of new voters, we
find that union membership indeed makes workers
less likely to abandon Left parties when these parties
appeal to non-workers. On the other hand, our results
suggest that unionized middle-class voters are particularly
prone to abandon Left parties that mobilize working-class
voters.
The results of our analysis of the behavior of voters
who have abandoned the mainstream Left can be
summarized as follows. Controlling for union member-
ship, workers who abandon the mainstream Left are more
likely to abstain from voting and to vote for radical Right
parties while they are less likely to vote for mainstream
Center-Right parties and for Greens than non-workers
who abandon the mainstream Left. Among working-class
leavers, union membership is associated with a lower
probability of abstention and a higher probability of
voting for radical Left parties. Among non-workers who
abandon the mainstream Left, union membership is
associated with a lower probability of voting for main-
stream Center-Right parties and, again, with a higher
probability of voting for radical Left parties.
Our analyses rely on data from the Comparative Study
of Electoral Systems (CSES). As Module 1 of the CSES
does not include the retrospective voting question that
allows us to identify relevant samples of survey respond-
ents, we rely exclusively on surveys from Modules 2–4.
Having dropped a few surveys for lack of data on
independent variables of interest, our dataset consists of
forty elections in sixteen countries over the period 2001–
2015.1
Two limitations of our empirical analysis should be
noted at the outset. First, the most recent elections
included in the CSES data on which we rely took place
in 2015. Hence our analysis fails to capture the recent rise
of radical Right parties as direct competitors to main-
stream Left parties. Secondly, our data only allows us to
analyze short-term voter trajectories, i.e., changes in
voting behavior from one election to the next. It may
be that some of the voters who we identify as “leavers”
subsequently returned to the mainstream Left or that they
subsequently moved to parties other than those that we
identify as their “destination.” For example, Evans and
Mellon’s (2016) analysis of British panel data shows that
the Conservatives lost more votes to UKIP than Labour
did in 2015, but many UKIP voters were former Labour
voters who either did not vote or voted for the Con-
servatives in 2010.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin
by documenting the decline of mainstream Left parties
and then summarize the core arguments in Paper Stones.
In the third section, we explain the class categories that we
use in our empirical analyses, introduce our measure of the
class profile of new Left-party voters, and present de-
scriptive data on the class composition of electorates and
unionization by social class as well as the class profile of
new Left-party voters. While the fourth section analyzes
how class profiles affect the propensity of different voters
to abandon the mainstream Left, the fifth section addresses
the question of where the leavers have gone. And then we
conclude.
The Electoral Decline of the
Mainstream Left
For nineteen liberal democracies, table 1 tracks the
electoral decline of mainstream Left parties based on
2 Perspectives on Politics
Article | Paper Stones Revisited
official election results. The first column records the post-
war election year in which the vote share of the mainstream
Left party peaked and the second column records the year
of the most recent election. In the following three
columns, we adjust for extraordinary elections by reporting
the average vote share of the mainstream Left party over
two elections: 1) for the peak election and the immediately
following election; 2) for the best two elections in the
1990s; and 3) for the two most recent elections. Finally,
the last two columns of table 1 report on changes in the
average vote share from the 1990s to the two most recent
elections, with change measured first in percentage points
and then as a percentage of the 1990s vote share.2
Table 1 sorts countries (parties) into five groups. The
first group consists of the three countries in which Social
Democrats most successfully mobilized working-class
voters in the wake of democratization: Denmark, Norway
and Sweden. Aided by the fragmentation of the Center-
Right, the mainstream Left held a position of political
dominance for several decades in these countries. The
second group consists of countries in which Left parties
became one of the two main electoral contenders in the
post-war period, competing with a united Center-Right
party. This characterization applies to the Anglophone
Labour parties, operating under more or less majoritarian
electoral rules, but also to the Austrian and German Social
Democrats. The common characteristic of the third group
of countries is that Left parties have always faced strong
competition from at least two Center-Right parties. The
fourth group consists of Southern European countries in
which Socialists parties made dramatic electoral advances
in the 1980s, emerging as one of the two main electoral
contenders and, in the Greek and Spanish cases, briefly
appeared to be on the verge of becoming dominant parties.
Finally, Iceland and Italy constitute special cases in that
their mainstream Left parties reconstituted themselves in
the early 2000s, rendering over-time comparisons of
electoral performance less straightforward.3
For our purposes, the most striking feature of table 1 is
that the average vote share of all mainstream Left parties,
regardless of their past performance, has fallen since the
1990s. Averaging across the nineteen countries included in
table 1, the vote share of the mainstream Left fell by just
about ten percentage points, and by nearly one-third, from
the best two elections of 1990s to the two most recent
elections. It should come as no surprise that when change
is measured in percentage points, small parties have
generally done better than large parties. When we instead
measure change relative to initial levels, the Greek Socialist
Party (PASOK) stands out as the mainstream Left party
that has performed the worst by far, having lost more than
80% of its 1990s vote share. With vote-share losses
between 40% and 44%, Iceland’s Social Democratic
Alliance, the Dutch Labor Party, the Spanish Socialists,
and the German SPD have also done very badly at the
polls. The French Socialists appear to have done relatively
well, but it must be noted that the French figure for recent
elections is the average of a very strong performance in
2012 (30.4%) and disastrous performance in 2017
(9.5%). Ignoring the French case, the British, Irish, and
New Zealand Labour parties stand out as the mainstream
Left parties whose vote shares have held up the best (falling
by 7.7%, 12.8%, and 16.0% respectively).
Aggregating our survey data for the period 2001–2015
provides another way to illustrate the electoral difficulties
of mainstream Left parties. Pooling the forty election
surveys on which we draw, 32% of mainstream-Left voters
in the previous election either abstained from voting or
voted for another party, while 26% of mainstream-Left
voters in the current election were newcomers. By
comparison, electoral support for Center-Right parties
was considerably more stable, with only 19% of their
voters leaving and newcomers accounting for 21% of their
electorate.4 While newcomers outnumbered leavers by
two percentage points for Center-Right parties, leavers
outnumbered newcomers by six percentage points for
mainstream Left parties.
Setting aside the reconstituted Icelandic and Italian
parties, all but one of the mainstream Left parties whose
vote shares are recorded in table 1 peaked well before the
1990s and suffered substantial vote-share losses from their
peak to the 1990s. The electoral decline of the mainstream
Left that occurred over the period covered by our analysis
represents the continuation of a trend that dates back to
the 1970s (see Rennwald 2015). Arguably, the recent rise
of right-wing populist parties with a strong working-class
base should be seen as a late manifestation—rather than
the cause—of the electoral decline of the mainstream Left.
Paper Stones Revisited
The analytical history of electoral socialism presented in
Paper Stones (1986) proceeds from the “constructivist”—
or Gramscian—proposition that the rhetoric and activities
of political parties determine the voting behavior of
individuals. For Przeworski and Sprague, there is nothing
natural about politics being organized on the basis of class
divisions in society. In their words, “the claims of workers
are particularistic, and when workers organize as a class
they seek to impose upon the entire society the image of
classes, each endowed with particularistic interests.” By
contrast, capitalists represent themselves as a class “only in
moments of folly.” Their response to the particularistic
claims of the working class “is not a particularism of the
bourgeoisie but ideologies which deny altogether the
salience of class interests, either by posing a universalistic
model of society composed of individual-citizens whose
interests are in harmony or by evoking alternative partic-
ularisms of religion, language, ethnicity, etc.” In short, the
salience of class for politics and, in particular, for the
political behavior of workers depends on the presence of
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political parties that seek to mobilize workers as a class
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 8-10).
Przeworski and Sprague proceed to document that,
contrary to the expectations of Marx and other nine-
teenth-century socialist thinkers, the development of
industrial capitalism did not usher in wholesale pro-
letarianization. Farmers, shopkeepers, and other small
businessmen were indeed displaced, but they were
replaced by new middle classes as well as manual workers.
According to Przeworski and Sprague’s census-based
estimates for seven West European countries, manual
workers as a proportion of the electorate peaked some
time between 1900 and 1950. Workers constituted just
about 50% of the Belgian electorate in the early 1920s, but
their share of the electorate never exceeded 40% in the
other six countries (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 39).
Recognizing that the mobilization of working-class
voters could not possibly deliver the electoral majority
required to implement systemic reforms by democratic
means, socialist parties began to court other electoral
constituencies—in the first instance, small farmers and
farm laborers, but also, increasingly, the new middle
classes. In pursuing what Przeworski and Sprague refer
to as “supra-class strategies,” they abandoned or, at least,
postponed some of their more radical ambitions. This is
a familiar story and its retelling by Przeworski and Sprague
is not terribly distinctive. What makes Paper Stones an
important book is the observation that reformist socialist
parties, firmly committed to democratic principles and
pursuing supra-class strategies, have very rarely succeeded
in mobilizing a majority of voters. The rapid rise of these
parties in the wake of democratization was followed, from
Table 1
The vote share of mainstream Left parties




















Norway 1961 2017 45.0 36.0 29.1 -6.9 -19.4
Denmark 1960 2019 42.0 36.7 26.1 -10.6 -28.9
Sweden 1968 2018 47.7 41.5 29.7 -11.8 -28.4
2. Long-term
contenders:
UK 1966 2019 45.6 39.1 36.1 -3.0 -7.7
Australia 1972 2016 49.2 42.2 34.1 -8.1 -19.2
Germany 1972 2017 44.2 38.7 23.1 -15.6 -40.3
New Zealand 1972 2017 44.0 36.9 31.0 -5.9 -16.0
Austria 1979 2017 49.3 40.5 27.7 -12.8 -31.6
3. Permanent
also-rans:
Belgium 1961 2019 32.5 25.0 18.3 -6.7 -26.8
Switzerland 1963 2019 25.1 22.2 17.8 -4.4 -19.8
Ireland 1969 2016 15.4 14.9 13.0 -1.9 -12.8
Netherlands 1977 2017 31.1 26.5 15.3 -11.2 -42.3
Finland 1995 2019 25.6 25.6 17.1 -8.5 -33.2
4. Post-1980
risers:
France 1981 2017 34.0 22.3 20.0 -2.3 -10.3
Greece 1981 2019 47.0 44.2 7.2 -37.0 -83.7
Spain 1982 2019 46.4 38.2 22.3 -15.9 -41.6




Iceland 2003 2018 28.9 — 16.4 -12.5* -43.3*
Italy 2008 2018 29.3 — 22.1 -7.2* -24.6*
Average -10.1 -29.0
For Iceland and Italy, changes recorded in the third panel refer to differences between the first and the third columns of the middle
panel; for the other countries they refer to differences between the second and third columns of the middle panel. Sources: Armingeon
et al. 2018, supplemented by data from Wikipedia for recent elections.
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the 1940s onwards, by a long period of electoral stagna-
tion. Przeworski and Sprague’s explanation of this puzzle
boils down to the following proposition: seeking to
mobilize support among non-workers by making supra-
class appeals, socialist parties undermine the salience of
class to workers and thereby enable other political parties
to compete for the working-class vote.
Analyzing aggregate voting patterns from 1900 to
1980, Przeworski and Sprague identify a persistent
trade-off: as socialist parties have gained support among
other classes, they have invariably lost support among
workers. Their analysis also shows that the steepness of
this trade-off varies considerably across countries and, as
a result, so does the “carrying capacity” of socialist parties.
Over the time period covered by Przeworksi and Sprague’s
analysis, the trade-offs faced by Danish, Norwegian, and
Swedish Social Democrats were less steep than the trade-
offs faced by their Belgian, Finnish, French, and German
counterparts. In other words, the Scandinavian parties
suffered smaller losses among working-class voters as they
expanded their electoral base beyond the working class.
Seeking to explain cross-national variation in the
steepness of the electoral trade-off, Przeworski and
Sprague argue that the presence of rival parties mobilizing
workers on the basis of class (communist parties) or some
other “particularistic identity” (religion, language, ethnic-
ity) render socialist parties that pursue supra-class strate-
gies particularly vulnerable to working-class defections
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 71-74). However, their
main explanation of variation in the steepness of the trade-
off has to do with unionization. Unions, Przeworski and
Sprague argue (74-79), serve to sustain the class identity of
workers and thereby reduce the need for socialist parties to
emphasize class politics in order to retain the support of
workers.5
As noted by Sainsbury (1990), Przeworski and
Sprague’s empirical analysis proceeds from a narrow and
arguably old-fashioned conceptualization of the working
class as consisting exclusively of manual workers employed
in mining, manufacturing, construction, transport and
agriculture. Sainsbury (1990, 34) also points out that
Przeworski and Sprague’s analysis does not involve any
direct observations of the proportion of workers voting
socialist. Instead, Przeworski and Sprague estimate this
critical parameter based on the proportion of workers
within the population eligible to vote and official election
results.
Our individual-level analysis of survey data is meant to
complement Przeworski and Sprague’s macro-level his-
torical analysis of election results, but also to address the
concerns raised by Sainsbury. Analyzing survey data allows
us to observe directly the class profile of Left party
electorates and to assess whether or not working-class
voters become less loyal supporters of Left parties as these
parties mobilize other voters. As we explain later, we
pursue this strategy based on a definition of the working
class that is considerably broader than Przeworski and
Sprague’s definition. We also seek to break new ground by
exploring the effects of union membership among middle-
class voters, departing from Przeworski and Sprague’s
conceptualization of unionization as exclusively a work-
ing-class phenomenon.
In principle, the trade-off argument pertains to voters
switching to Left parties as well as voters abandoning Left
parties. For the time period covered by our analysis, it
makes sense to focus on voters leaving the mainstream
Left. The core hypothesis that we derive from Paper
Stones is that workers are less likely to abandon the
mainstream Left parties than other voters when these
parties actively appeal to working-class voters and, con-
versely, that they are more likely to abandon the main-
stream Left parties when they do not target their electoral
appeals in this fashion. Also derived from Przeworski and
Sprague’s argumentation, our second hypothesis is that
unionized workers are less responsive to the mobilizational
strategies of Left parties than workers who are not union
members, i.e., that they are less likely to abandon
mainstream Left parties that mobilize middle-class voters.
As for the effects of unionization among middle-class
voters, we do not have strong prior expectations, but it
seems reasonable to suppose that unionization renders
middle-class voters as well as working-class voters more
likely to vote for Left parties and, by extension, more loyal
to these parties.
Leaving individual-level implications aside for the time
being, Przeworski and Sprague’s argumentation suggests
that unionization affects the carrying capacity or, in other
words, the long-term vote share of Left parties. Plotting
changes in the average vote share of Left parties from the
1990s to the two most recent elections against changes in
union density from 1990 to 2016 (as recorded by Visser
2019), there does not appear to be any association
whatsoever between these two developments. As reported
in table 2, however, the picture changes if we estimate
a simple OLS regression model with a couple of dummy
variables as controls. The first dummy variable takes the
value of 1 for countries with a small effective number of
parties, averaged over the period 1990–2017 (Australia,
Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and the UK). The
second dummy variable takes the value of 1 for countries
that experienced a sharp economic downturn while the
mainstream Left party held the office of prime minister in
2008–2011 (Iceland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the
UK). When both of these variables are included in the
model, the presence of more competitors and incumbency
during crisis are both associated with a larger decline in the
vote share of mainstream Left parties and, most impor-
tantly for our purposes, a one-percentage-point decline in
union density is associated with a vote-share decline of
nearly half a percentage point. Given the small number of
5
observations, these results should surely be taken with
a grain of salt, but they suggest that union decline might
indeed be an important factor behind the electoral decline
of mainstream Left parties.6
Class Membership of Voters and Class
Profiles of Parties
Social class is the critical individual-level variable in our
analysis of where mainstream-Left voters have gone as
well as in our analysis of who has abandoned the
mainstream Left. In identifying election-survey respond-
ents as members of social classes, we rely on the
occupational class schema proposed by Oesch (2006).
The Oesch schema distinguishes classes—or class seg-
ments—based on work logics as well as skills and the
nature of employment contracts. The vertical dimension
—labor market status—serves to distinguish between
employers and self-employed, on the one hand, and
employees, on the other hand, and then to distinguish
two broad classes of employees: the middle class and the
working class. The horizontal dimension in turn serves to
identify three distinct segments of the middle class and the
working class. In Oesch’s terminology, the middle class
consists of managers, technical experts, and socio-cultural
professionals while the working class consists of clerical
staff, production workers, and service workers. Again on
the vertical dimension, Oesch distinguishes further be-
tween more- and less-skilled members of these six “clas-
ses.”
As documented by Oesch and many others, low-skilled
individuals employed in services occupy disadvantageous
positions in the labor market that are comparable to (or
worse than) the positions of production workers in terms
of job security, occupational status, and earnings. While
these individuals are less likely to be unionized and may
be less likely to self-identify as “working class” than
production workers, they are surely part of the working
class as defined by objective criteria. In our view, “clerical
staff” constitutes a more heterogeneous occupational
category and assigning all individuals in this category to
“the working class” stretches the latter concept too far. For
the purposes of our paper, we define “the working class” as
production and service workers and categorize clerical
staff, along with middle-class professionals, managers,
farmers, and businessmen as “non-workers.”
Thus conceived, “non-workers” constitute a broad
swath of the electorate and it seems plausible to suppose
that some non-workers will be more attracted to parties
with a strong working-class profile than others. In partic-
ular, an extensive literature, spearheaded by Kitschelt
(1994) and Kriesi (1998), emphasizes the importance of
socio-cultural professionals as an electoral constituency
that has become increasingly important to Left parties
since the 1970s (see also Kitschelt and Rehm 2014;
Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Gingrich and Häusermann
2015). The core claim of this literature is that socio-
cultural work (“people processing”) makes people more
disposed in favor of progressive positions on the distrib-
utive dimension as well as the cultural dimension of
politics and that socio-cultural professionals constitute
a natural ally of workers in the domain of redistributive
politics. As recognized by several contributions to the
literature, the fact that socio-cultural professionals com-
monly work in the public sector arguably provides
Table 2
Correlates of change in the vote share of mainstream Left parties since the 1990s (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D union density -.042 .075 .037 .459*
(.826) (.736) (.840) (.020)
Two-party dominance — 4.765 — 14.123**
(.309) (.002)
Crisis1incumbency — — -7.6471 -15.201**
(.069) (.001)
Constant -10.599 -10.715 -7.651 -5.370
(.002) (.002) (.024) (.040)
N 19 19 19 19
Adjusted R-square -.056 -.049 .093 .488
Notes: P-values in parentheses: 1p , 0.10, * p , 0.05, ** p , 0.01.
The dependent variable is the difference in the average vote share from elections in the 1990s to the two most recent elections, as
reported in table 1. Change in union density is the difference between 1990 and 2016 figures, as recorded by Visser 2019. The dummy
for two-party dominance takes the value of 1 if the average effective number of parties over the period 1990–2017 is 3 or less, based on
Gallagher n.d. With a score of 3.006, Spain is coded as a case of two-party dominance. The country with the next lowest effective
number of parties is Austria, at 3.59. Refer to the text for further explanations.
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another, more “self-interested” basis for the apparent
alignment of socio-cultural professionals with the working
class as core constituencies of mainstream Left parties over
the last two or three decades.
In keeping with the worker-centric framework of Paper
Stones, we begin by estimating the trade-off between
mobilizing workers and non-workers and then explore
whether or not socio-cultural professionals respond differ-
ently to working-class mobilization than other non-work-
ers. The category “non-workers” could, of course, be
disaggregated further—as, indeed, could the category
“workers”—but we do not have any strong theoretical
reasons for doing so and it is not our goal, in this paper, to
contribute to the empirical literature on occupation and
vote choice.
We present CSES-based estimates of the distribution
of the total electorate sorted into workers, socio-cultural
professionals and other non-workers as well as estimates
of unionization by social class in online appendices 2
and 3. By our definition, the working class constitutes,
on average, 33% of the electorate in the sixteen
countries included in our analysis. Australia and Switzer-
land stand out as the countries with the smallest
working classes (22%–23%). In the other fourteen
countries, the working-class share of the electorate ranges
between 27% (Greece) and 43% (Finland). The working
class is nowhere close to an electoral majority, but it
represents a large electoral constituency, which Left
parties ignore at their peril. On average, socio-cultural
professionals constitute 17% of the electorate in our
sixteen countries. Setting aside the exceptional case of
Spain (7%), their share of the electorate ranges between
14% and 25%. Averaging across the sixteen countries,
voters who are neither workers nor socio-cultural pro-
fessionals constitute 50% the electorate, but workers and
socio-cultural professionals together constitute an elec-
toral majority in ten of these countries.7
As shown in online appendix 3, the rate of unionization
of socio-cultural professionals is equivalent to or higher
than the rate of unionization among production and
service workers in all but one country (Norway). Averaging
across the sixteen countries, the rate of unionization for
socio-cultural professionals exceeds the rate of unionization
for production and service workers by five percentage
points (46% compared to 41%). The average unionization
rate of “other non-workers” is significantly lower (32%),
but there are a handful of countries in which unionization of
“other non-workers” is more or less equivalent with
unionization of workers (France, Spain, Switzerland and
the UK).
In the first set of analyses that we present here, we
explore electoral trade-offs by analysing how the mobi-
lization strategies of mainstream Left parties, measured
by the class profile of new voters that they attract,
condition the probability that members of different
classes will abandon these parties. Our measure of the
class profile of electoral mobilization is the percentage of
workers (as defined earlier) among new voters for the
mainstream Left divided by the (election-specific) per-
centage of workers in the potential population of new
voters, i.e., the percentage of workers in the subset of the
electorate that did not vote for the mainstream Left in
the previous election. This ratio takes a value greater
than 1 if workers are overrepresented among new voters,
relative to their share of potential new voters, and a value
of less than 1 if workers are underrepresented among
new voters. New voters may be either first-time voters or
voters who switched to the party in the election that just
occurred.8
Table 3 provides descriptive data on the class profile of
electoral mobilization, which ranges from .79 for the
Swiss Social Democrats in the election of 2011 to 2.21 for
the Greek Socialists in the election of 2012. The Greek
figure is problematic because 2012 was a catastrophic
election for the Greek socialists and only two new
socialist voters were recorded by the election survey.
The Austrian election of 2013 is as another case with very
few new voters for the mainstream Left included in the
survey. For the remaining thirty-eight elections, the
figures presented in table 3 are based on calculations
with at least thirty new voters for the mainstream Left and
the maximum score is 1.76 (Finland in 2011). Among
the parties for which we have at least two observations of
electoral performance, Australian Labour, New Zealand
Labour, and the Swedish Social Democrats stand out as
having most consistently mobilized more workers than
non-workers over the period 2001–2015.
Following Przeworski and Sprague (1986) as well as
recent literature that emphasizes “supply-side” explana-
tions of class voting (e.g., Evans and De Graaf 2013;
Rennwald and Evans 2014; Rennwald 2015), we assume
that the class composition of new voters reflects, at least
in part, the mobilization strategies that Left parties
pursue and that old as well as new voters for the
mainstream Left respond to the appeals that these parties
make during electoral campaigns. Parties seeking to
appeal to working-class voters are likely to emphasize
different issues and to position themselves differently on
some issues than parties seeking to appeal to middle-class
voters. It is tempting to assume that Left parties that seek
mobilize workers will be more “leftist” in their pro-
grammatic orientation, at least with respect to policies
with important distributive implications, but it is im-
portant to keep in mind, we think, that Labour and Social
Democratic parties that successfully mobilized working-
class majorities in the post-war era often did so on the
basis of quite moderate political platforms. Arguably,
moderate and leftist policy proposals alike might be
framed in more or less “workerist” terms and the framing
of policies is as important as the policies themselves (cf.
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Evans and Tilley 2017; Thau 2017). We shall return to
this question in the concluding discussion.
Voter Responses to the Class Profile of
Electoral Mobilization
As noted at the outset, we rely on harmonized national
post-election surveys assembled by the Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to analyze determi-
nants of individual decisions to abandon the mainstream
Left and then to explore, in a second step (the fifth
section), where the leavers have gone. Both sets of
analyses are restricted to survey respondents who, by
their own account, voted for the mainstream Left in the
election prior to the one that just occurred. With nested
data and dichotomous dependent variables, we follow the
standard practice of estimating hierarchical logistic re-
gression models, with country-elections as the level-2
units. However, this setup does not fully take into
account the complex structure of our data. For eleven
out of sixteen countries, we have observations for at least
two elections. Following Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother
(2016), we take this complication into account by
estimating random effects at the country level as well as
the country-election level. Thus our analysis controls not
only for unique characteristics of particular elections, but
also for enduring features of electoral competition that are
specific to a particular country.9
In our first set of analyses, the dependent variable
takes the value 1 for respondents who abstained or voted
for another party in the election that just took place and
zero for those who again voted for the mainstream Left
party. The independent variables of theoretical interest
at the individual level are social class and union
membership, both captured by dummy variables. As
explained earlier, our core hypotheses concern the
interaction of class and union membership with the
class profile of electoral mobilization by mainstream Left
parties and we use the relative representation of workers
among new voters as a proxy for parties’ mobilization
efforts.
Our regression models include individual-level controls
for age, gender, education and residence (village, small or
medium city, suburbs, large city). These are standard
socio-demographic control variables that have been
shown to be relevant predictors for mainstream Left
voting, but we do not have strong theoretical expectations
as to how they might affect probabilities of abandoning
the mainstream Left or the trajectories of voters who
abandon the mainstream Left.
To take account of options available to voters who
consider abandoning the mainstream Left party, we
include the vote shares of Radical Left, Radical Right,
and Green parties in the previous election as macro-level
variables. In addition, we include a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the mainstream Left party was in
government going into the election and another dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for elections during or
immediately following the crisis of 2008–2010 if the
mainstream Left party held the office of prime minister at
the time and the crisis was very severe.10
To begin with, we distinguish between workers and
non-workers and interact the dummy for working-class
respondent with the class profile of new voters, treating
union membership as a control variable. For the forty
election-years in our dataset, figure 1a presents our
estimates of the average marginal effect of the respondent
Table 3
Class profile of electoral mobilization by mainstream Left parties, 2001–2015
2001-04 2005-08 2009-11 2012-15 average
Australia 2004, 2007, 2013 0.99 (124) 1.33 (257) — 1.59 (148) 1.39
Austria 2013 — — — 1.47 (12) 1.47
Denmark 2001 1.07 (54) — — — 1.07
Finland 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 0.95 (40) 1.05 (31) 1.76 (30) 1.07 (30) 1.21
France 2012 — — — 1.04 (200) 1.04
Germany 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 1.19 (131) 0.91 (142) 0.87 (33) 0.89 (53) 0.96
Greece 2009, 2012 — — 0.81 (41) 2.21 (2) 1.51
Iceland 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013 1.08 (138) 0.88 (81) 1.06 (95) 1.19 (31) 1.05
Ireland 2002, 2007 0.95 (53) 0.88 (43) — — 0.93
Netherlands 2002, 2006, 2010 0.88 (34) 1.06 (74) 0.96 (95) — 0.97
New Zealand 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014 1.24 (130) 1.75 (51) 1.67 (65) 1.60 (81) 1.54
Norway 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 0.98 (39) 1.04 (155) 1.08 (112) 1.06 (60) 1.04
Spain 2004 1.31 (98) — — — 1.31
Sweden 2002, 2006, 2014 1.34 (79) 1.51 (64) — 1.50 (65) 1.45
Switzerland 2011 — — 0.79 (169) — 0.79
United Kingdom 2005, 2015 — 1.07 (35) — 0.82 (102) 0.91
The number of survey respondents who switched to the mainstream Left in a given election is provided in parentheses. Calculations
based on CSES data. Refer to the text for our operationalization of “class profile.”
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being a worker on the probability of abandoning the
mainstream Left conditional on the class profile of new
voters for the mainstream Left while figure 1b shows
estimated probabilities of workers and non-workers aban-
doning the mainstream Left conditional on the class
profile of new voters.11 Figures 2a and 2b in turn show
the results that we obtain when we restrict the analysis to
the thirty-eight elections for which we have at least thirty
new voters for the mainstream Left (i.e., drop the Greek
election of 2012 and the Austrian election of 2013). Wary
of the small-N problem, we consider the latter set of results
to be more meaningful, but it is instructive to consider
both sets of results.12
With or without the Greece 2012 and Austria 2013
elections, we find that middle-class supporters are more
likely to abandon mainstream Left parties than working-
class supporters when these parties primarily mobilize
new working-class voters. At the maximum level of over-
representation of workers among new voters, the differ-
ence in the probabilities of middle-class and working-class
supporters abandoning the mainstream Left is slightly
greater than eight percentage points. On the other hand,
there appears to be no difference in the propensity of
middle-class and working-class supporters to abandon
Figure 1
(a) The average marginal effect of social class
conditional on the class profile of electoral
mobilization and 95% confidence intervals
(forty elections), (b) Predicted probabilities of
leaving the mainstream Left by social class
conditional on the class profile of electoral
mobilization (forty elections).
Based on Model 3 in online appendix 5.
Figure 2
(a) The average marginal effect of social class
conditional on the class profile of electoral
mobilization and 95% confidence intervals,
without Greece 2012 and Austria 2013 (thirty-
eight elections), (b) Predicted probabilities of
leaving the mainstream Left by social class
conditional on the class profile of electoral
mobilization (thirty-eight elections)
Based on Model 3 in online appendix 6.
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mainstream Left parties that primarily mobilize new
middle-class voters. When the cases with less than thirty
new voters are included, the trade-off between working-
class support and middle-class support stems as much, if
not more, from middle-class aversion to Left parties that
mobilize workers than from working-class aversion to
Left parties that mobilize non-workers, but when we drop
those two cases working-class voters seem to be more
responsive to the class profile of newcomers.
The differences in the probability of workers or non-
workers abandoning the mainstream Left across the range
of values for the class profile of new voters do not clear
conventional thresholds of statistical significance, but, as
figures 1a and 2a illustrate, the differences between work-
ers and non-workers are significant with 95% confidence
for values greater than 0.1. In other words, the differential
responsiveness of workers and non-workers to the class
profile of new voters is statistically significant when these
groups are considered jointly.
The flat line for non-workers in figure 2b could be
because non-workers include socio-cultural professionals,
commonly conceived as a core constituency of the
mainstream Left and a natural ally of Left-leaning workers.
Exploring this question, figure 3 replicates figure 2b based
on estimating a model that treats socio-cultural profes-
sionals as separate from other non-workers. In a nutshell,
we find no evidence that “other non-workers” are more
responsive to the class profile of party appeals than socio-
cultural professionals.13
Figure 2B and figure 3 both suggest that mobilizing
workers is a win-win strategy for mainstream Left parties, as
it does not appear to be associated with defections by
middle-class supporters of these parties. However, there are
more potential middle-class voters than working-class voters
and thus it may well be the case that appealing to middle-
class voters is still the most rational vote-maximizing
strategy for these parties.
Turning to the role of unionization, the first thing to
note is that all of our models yield a direct effect of union
membership that is negative and highly significant.
Everything else being equal, union members are less
likely to abandon the mainstream Left than non-
members. Sticking with the three-class setup (i.e., treating
socio-cultural professional as separate from other non-
workers), and with data for thirty-eight elections, we
explore the role of unionization further by estimating
a model with three-way interactions between respond-
ents’ class, union membership, and representation of
workers among new mainstream Left voters. Table 4
summarizes the results of this exercise (refer to online
appendix 7 for full regression results). Consistent with
Przeworski and Sprague’s hypothesis, we find that union-
ization of production and service workers indeed mitigates
the trade-off faced by mainstream Left parties: unionized
workers are less likely to abandon mainstream Left parties
when they appeal to non-workers (from negative values to
the mean values of class profile) than workers who are not
union members. When Left parties primarily mobilize
workers (positive values), the union effect among workers
disappears, i.e., there is no significant difference in the
probability of union members and non-members to
abandon the mainstream Left. By contrast, middle-class
unionization seems to reinforce the trade-off faced by Left
parties. Relative to non-members, socio-cultural profes-
sionals as well as other non-workers who are union
members are less likely to abandonmainstream Left parties
that primarily appeal to non-workers, but they are not less
likely to abandon mainstream Left parties that primarily
appeal to workers. As we shall see in the next section,
unionized non-workers and especially unionized socio-
cultural professionals have a particular affinity for Greens
and radical Left parties. Arguably, this is the main reason
for the apparently counter-intuitive effect of union mem-
bership on loyalty to mainstream Left parties that seek to
mobilize workers.
Based on a three-way interaction model that simply
distinguishes between workers and non-workers (i.e.,
ignores the distinction between socio-cultural professio-
nals and other non-workers), figure 4a replicates figure
2b for non-unionized respondents while figure 4b
replicates it for unionized respondents. With the differ-
ence in class-specific probabilities of abandoning the
mainstream Left approaching ten percentage points when
over-representation of workers among new voters takes
Figure 3
Predicted probabilities of leaving the main-
stream Left by class (sociocultural professio-
nals as separate category), conditional on the
class profile of electoral mobilization (thirty-
eight elections)
Based on Model 1 in online appendix 7.
10 Perspectives on Politics
Article | Paper Stones Revisited
its maximum value, the trade-off between working-class
and middle-class support is more pronounced than in
figure 2b when we only look at non-unionized respond-
ents. Comparing the two panels in figure 4, it is
immediately apparent not only that unionized respond-
ents are less likely to abandon mainstream Left parties,
regardless of the class profile of new voters, but also that
the trade-off between working-class and middle-class
support is much less steep among unionized respondents
than among non-unionized respondents. As shown in
figure 5b, the trade-off for unionized respondents does
not clear the 95% threshold for statistical significance.
The difference in the steepness of the trade-offs
appears to be primarily due to the stronger loyalty of
unionized working-class voters to Left parties that
mobilize non-workers. In sum, our results indicate
that working-class de-unionization does indeed rein-
force the electoral dilemma identified by Przeworski
Figure 4
Predicted probabilities of leaving the main-
stream Left by social class conditional on the
class profile of electoral mobilization (thirty-
eight elections)
Based on Model 4 in online appendix 6.
Figure 5
The average marginal effect of social class
conditional on the class profile of electoral
mobilization, with 95% confidence intervals
(thirty-eight elections)
Based on Model 4 in online appendix 6.
11
and Sprague (1986), but this is not the case for middle-
class de-unionization.14
Where Have the Leavers Gone?
We now turn to the question of where voters who
abandoned the mainstream Left have gone or, more
precisely, where they went when they abandoned the
mainstream Left. As this analysis is restricted to “leavers,”
i.e., to survey respondents who say that they voted for the
mainstream Left in the previous election and did not vote
for the mainstream Left in the current election, the total
number of observations is much smaller than in our
analysis of the choice whether to abandon or stay with
the mainstream Left.
We consider each of the following options available to
voters who abandon the mainstream Left: 1) non-voting,
2) vote for a Center-Right party, 3) vote for a Green
party, 4) vote for a radical Left party, or 5) vote for
a radical Right party. Pooling all forty elections at our
disposal, the distribution of choices by the 3,889
respondents who abandoned the mainstream Left is as
follows: 45% voted for a Center-Right party, 16% voted
for the radical Left, 16% abstained from voting, 15%
voted for the Greens, and 8% voted for the radical Right.
The small number of leavers who turned to the radical
Right comes as something of a surprise, but other studies
(e.g., Evans and Mellon 2016) show that radical Right
parties primarily draw voters from Center-Right parties
and that mainstream-Left leavers who end up voting for
the radical Right commonly transition through the
Center-Right. (Of course, it may also be the case that
right-wing populist parties have become more direct
competitors of mainstream Left parties in elections since
2015).
As in the analysis of abandonment of the mainstream
Left, we are interested in how class and union member-
ship and the interaction between them shape the electoral
behavior of individuals. Przeworski and Sprague’s core
argument is that supra-class strategies appeal to voters as
individual citizens and thus turn workers into issue-
oriented voters without strong partisan attachments
(e.g., Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 51). The implication
would seem to be that workers who abandon the main-
stream Left might go anywhere and should not be expected
to behave differently from non-workers. At the same time,
however, Przeworski and Sprague (74-79) suggest that the
presence of rival parties that appeal to workers on the basis
of class or some other “particularistic” identity renders the
mainstream Left more vulnerable when it adopts supra-
class strategies.
Going beyond Paper Stones, there can be little doubt
that working-class households have fared badly by com-
parison to middle-class households in terms of income
growth and economic insecurity since the 1990s. Global-
ization in general and immigration in particular threaten
the economic status of workers to a far greater extent than
they threaten the economic status of middle-class profes-
sionals. At the same time, the policy platforms on which
mainstream Left parties have campaigned in elections (and
implemented in government) have typically prioritized
structural reforms designed to promote labor-market
flexibility and fiscal consolidation at the expense of
redistributive social spending (see, e.g., Rathgeb 2018,
Horn 2018, and Bremer 2019). Against this background,
it seems reasonable to suppose that workers who abandon
the mainstream Left do so with other options in mind than
their middle-class counterparts. More specifically, we
hypothesize that, relative to middle-class leavers, workers
who abandon the mainstream Left are more likely to
abstain from voting and more likely to vote for “anti-
establishment parties” of the radical Left or the radical
Right.15
We expect union membership to condition the effects
of class. Many studies show that union members are more
likely to vote and that the association between union
membership and electoral participation is strongest for
Table 4
Marginal effects of union membership on abandoning the mainstream Left conditional on
class and class profile of electoral mobilization (thirty-eight elections)
Class Profile of Electoral Mobilization







































Based on Model 2 in online appendix 7.
P-values in parentheses: 1p , 0.10, * p , 0.05, ** p , 0.01, *** p , 0.001.
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citizens with low socio-economic status (e.g., Kerrissey
and Schofer 2013; Rosenfeld 2014). Other studies have
shown that union membership is associated with support
for redistribution (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017) and
with support for immigration (Donnelly 2016). Drawing
on these studies, we propose three additional hypotheses:
• Union membership reduces the propensity of work-
ers who abandon the mainstream Left to abstain from
voting.
• Union membership reduces the propensity of work-
ers who abandon the mainstream Left to vote for the
radical Right.
• Union membership increases the propensity of work-
ers and non-workers to abandon the mainstream Left
in favor of other Left parties.
For each of the five options identified here, we again
estimate hierarchical logistic regression models, with
random intercepts for each country and country-election.
The dependent variable in each of the models is di-
chotomous: choosing the option or not. The models
include the individual-level control variables identified
earlier. As the class profile of electoral mobilization by
Left parties is no longer relevant, we do not include any
macro variables in this analysis (and hence we have no
reason to drop cases with small numbers of new voters for
Left parties). In estimating the models designed to predict
voting for Greens, the radical Left, and the radical Right,
we drop elections in which such parties were not
meaningful options.16
Sticking with three classes (workers, socio-cultural
professionals, and other non-workers) throughout the
analysis, we begin by estimating models that do not
interact class and union membership and then estimate
models with interaction terms added. Reported in online
appendix 9, the first set of models are less vulnerable to
the small-N problem and, in any case, provide the most
appropriate tests of our baseline hypotheses concerning
differences between workers and non-workers who aban-
don the mainstream Left. Figure 6 summarizes graphically
the results for social class. Relative to “other non-workers,”
workers who abandon the mainstream Left are more likely
to abstain and to vote for the radical Right while they are
less likely to vote for Greens and Center-Right parties.
Figure 6
Average marginal effects of social class on the choice of options, with 95% confidence intervals
Based on Models 1–5 in online appendix 9. The effects shown are relative to the reference category of non-workers.
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Against the same benchmark, socio-cultural professionals
are less likely to vote for Center-Right parties and more
likely to vote for Green parties.
As shown in table 5, the direct effects of union
membership are straightforward and, with one exception,
consistent with our expectations. Controlling for social
class, union members who abandon the mainstream Left
are less likely to stop voting and less likely to vote for the
Center-Right. Simply put, union members who abandon
mainstream Left parties are more likely to remain on the
Left, broadly conceived, than leavers who are not union
members. Note, however, that these results do not bear
our expectation concerning the radical Right: union
members who abandon the mainstream Left are as likely
to vote for the radical Right as respondents who are not
union members.
Turning to the results of estimating interaction mod-
els, table 6 presents the marginal effects of union member-
ship on choosing one of the five options conditional on
respondents’ social class. Among workers who abandon
the mainstream Left, union membership is associated with
continued voting and with voting for radical Left parties.
Again, contrary to our expectations, unionized workers are
not less likely to abandon the mainstream Left for the
radical Right than non-union workers. Among social-
cultural professionals, union membership moves Left-
party leavers away from the radical Right as well as the
Center-Right, towards Greens and, most strongly, towards
radical Left parties. Finally, among other non-workers who
abandon the mainstream Left, union membership is also
associated with a higher probability of voting for the
radical Left and a lower probability of voting for the
Center-Right.
Conclusion
Our analyses of CSES data for 2001–2015 show that class
remains an important feature of electoral behavior in
liberal democracies and, more specifically, that the trade-
off between working-class and middle-class support pos-
ited by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) continues to haunt
Left parties. As suggested by the authors of Paper Stones,
unionization of workers mitigates the electoral dilemma
of the mainstream Left, but our results indicate that
unionization of white-collar professionals and other
middle-class strata does not have this effect. Middle-class
voters who are unionized are more likely to vote for
mainstream Left parties, as well as other Left parties, than
middle-class voters who are not unionized, but they, too,
Table 6


































































Based on Models 6–10 in online appendix 9.
P-values in parentheses: 1p , 0.10, * p , 0.05, ** p , 0.01. T-test of equality hypothesis for differences.
Table 5
Average marginal effects of union membership on the choice of options
Center-Right -.0391 (0.053)
Non-voting -.041** (0.003)
Radical Left .088*** (0.000)
Greens .021 (0.172)
Radical Right -.011 (0.430)
Based on Models 1–5 in online appendix 9.
P-values in parentheses: 1p , 0.10, * p , 0.05, ** p , 0.01, *** p , 0.001.
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become more likely to abandon Left parties when these
parties target working-class voters in their mobilizational
efforts. While unionization keeps middle-class voters on
the Left, it may actually reinforce the trade-off between
working-class and middle-class support for mainstream
Left parties.
In short, union decline represents an electoral
problem for Left parties and this problem assumes
particular importance to the extent that union decline
is concentrated among production and service workers.
Good data on unionization rates by occupation are
hard to come by, but for countries with separate blue-
collar and white-collar unions, notably Sweden, we
know that it is primarily blue-collar unions that have
declined over the last twenty to thirty years (see
Mosimann and Pontusson 2018). More broadly, avail-
able data indicate that unionization has held up much
better in the public sector than in the private sector
(Pontusson 2013) and that de-unionization has been
most pronounced in the lower half of the earnings
distribution (Becher and Pontusson 2011, Mosimann
and Pontusson 2017).
In closing, it deserves to be noted that the preceding
analysis does not speak to the question of whether or
not some political projects—or, in other words, policy
packages—that mainstream Left parties might pursue
entail a sharper trade-off between working-class and
middle-class support than others. It is tempting to
suppose that “welfare-state universalism” allowed social
democratic parties to mobilize middle-class voters as
well as working-class voters in the postwar era and that
recent electoral difficulties of the mainstream Left might
be attributed to the exhaustion of this project. As Paper
Stones reminds us, however, the postwar expansion of
the welfare state was not accompanied by a steady
expansion of electoral support for mainstream Left
parties.
Our analysis emphasizes working-class organization
(or lack thereof) as a condition enabling (constraining)
Left parties to negotiate the dilemma of electoral
socialism. Following Przeworski and Sprague, we have
simply assumed that the class composition of new voters
tells us something meaningful about strategic choices
that parties make. But what is it that Left parties do (or
might do) to mobilize working-class voters? As a first,
very crude, attempt to address this question, table 7
presents the results of regressing our measure of the class
profile of electoral mobilization on two features of party
platforms captured by the Comparative Manifesto Pro-
ject (CMP): the overall Right-Left position of manifestos
and the percentage of positive mentions of labor—trade-
unions, workers, and the working-class—in party man-
ifestos. Needless to say, we do not suppose that ordinary
citizens read party manifestos. The premise of this
exercise is simply that manifestos tell us something
meaningful about what parties say in their election
campaigns.
The first set of results suggest that Left parties with
more leftist platforms tend to mobilize more middle-class
voters than working-class voters, but the association
between these variables disappears once we drop Greece
2012 and Austria 2013. More intuitively, pro-labor
statements in party manifestos are positively associated
with relative mobilization of workers. This association
Table 7
Correlates of the class profile of new voters (OLS regressions)
With GR 2012 and AT 2013 Without GR 2012 and AT 2013
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Right-Left position .007* .0061 .003 .001
(.030) (.070) (267) (.717)
Pro-labor statements .030 .0321 .0281 .032*
(.074) (.059) (.062) (.030)
No radical competitor .153 .2711
(.335) (.057)
Constant 1.178 1.132 1.090 .994
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
N 38 38 36 36
Adjusted R-square .127 .126 .067 .142
Notes: P-values in parentheses: 1p , 0.10, * p , 0.05.
Data on party platforms are from the Comparative Manifesto Project; Volkens et al. 2019a. The dependent variable is the class profile
of new voters, as reported in yable 3. The Left-Right position is the standardmeasure of the ComparativeManifesto Project (“rile”), “pro-
labor statements” refers to variable “per 701,” which the CMP codebook defines as “favourable references to all labour groups, the
working class and unemployed workers in general” and “support for trade unions and calls for the good treatment of all employees”
Volkens et al. 2019b, 20. All Australian elections, the New Zealand election of 2008, and the UK election of 2005 are coded as cases of
“no radical competition.” Norway 2013 and Finland 2015 are missing from this analysis for lack of CMP data.
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holds up when we drop the two cases with very small
numbers of new mainstream Left voters and becomes
statistically more significant when we include a dummy
that takes the value of 1 for elections in which radical Left
and radical Right parties did not win a single parliamen-
tary seat. As expected, the absence of radical competitors
is also associated with more workers among new voters
for the mainstream Left.17
In light of the small number of observations, the
results presented in table 7 are, at best, suggestive. In our
view, the main take-away is that being more “leftist” is not
a universal formula for mobilizing working-class voters.
This finding dovetails with our previous finding that
unionized middle-class voters, especially socio-cultural
professionals, often switch to radical Left parties when
mainstream Left parties mobilize workers.
The results presented in table 7 also suggest that
mainstream Left parties are more able to mobilize new
working-class support when they do not face radical Left
and radical Right competitors. This raises another
question that we want to pursue in future work. In the
analysis of electoral trade-offs presented above, we
control for the vote shares of Green, radical Left, and
radical Right parties in the previous election, but we do
not interact these macro variables with respondents’ class
positions (and the effects of the control variables are
rarely significant). In light of our analysis of where Left-
party leavers have gone, it seems plausible to suppose that
the presence of radical options, especially radical Right
options, increases the propensity of working-class voters
to abandon the mainstream Left more than it increases
the propensity of middle-class voters to abandon the
mainstream Left.
Our results are based on generalizing across countries
and over time. To address the question of whether or not
electoral trade-offs have become more severe for main-
stream Left parties, it would be worthwhile to replicate
the macro-level analysis in Paper Stones with more recent
data, but also to analyze surveys for individual countries
going back to the 1960s. Less obviously perhaps, the
preceding analyses assume that “union membership” has
similar implications across countries and individuals. We
have not taken into account that some unions are more
closely affiliated with mainstream Left parties than others
(see Arndt and Rennwald 2016) and that some are more
solidaristic than others (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017).
There are significant data constraints, but also exciting
research opportunities in this domain.
While further nuance surely needs to be added, the
core message of this paper boils down to the following
proposition: for self-interested reasons, mainstream Left
parties should worry about the decline of working-class
organization and should strive to reverse this process. As
many scholarly studies have shown, de-unionization is
not an inevitable result of structural changes in advanced
capitalist economies.18 To mention only a few examples,
political decisions pertaining to the regulation of tempo-
rary employment contracts, outsourcing of public services,
and the administration of unemployment insurance have
important consequences for working-class organization.
And working-class organization in turn has important
electoral consequences.
Notes
1 For further information about CSES data, refer to
http://www.cses.org/. The countries included in our
individual-level analyses are Australia, Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. (The
elections analysed for each country are listed in the first
column of table 3.) We also present some macro-level
evidence for Belgium, Italy, and Portugal. We exclude
the United States, Canada, Japan, and Eastern Europe
from our macro-level analysis as well as individual-
level analyses because of the difficulty of identifying
mainstream Left parties that satisfy of the criterion of
having historically prioritized the mobilization of
working-class voters. Refer to online appendix 1 for
our coding of parties in the CSES dataset.
2 Note that post-1980 figures for Belgium represent the
combined vote share of the Flemish and Francophone
socialist parties, that the figures for France refer to the
vote share of the Socialist Party in the first round of
parliamentary elections, and that the 2019 vote share
for the Greek socialists is the vote share for the
socialist-dominated electoral alliance called the
Movement for Change (KINAL). The measure
employed here arguably understates the electoral
strength of the French Socialist Party relative to other
mainstream Left parties in the 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s. It is important to keep in mind that the French
Socialists won three out of seven presidential elections
between 1981 and 2017.
3 The figures for Iceland refer to the Social Democratic
Alliance, formed in 2000 by the Social Democratic
Party and several smaller leftist parties, while the
figures for Italy refer to the Democratic Party, created
in 2006. The Social Democratic Alliance performed
better in the elections of 2003, 2007, and 2009 than
the Social Democratic Party had ever done. The
formation of the Italian Democratic Party was a com-
plicated process involving the incorporation of former
Radicals and Christian Democrats as well as the
departure of the left-wing faction of the former
Democratic Left Party, rendering cross-time compar-
isons particularly fraught, but note that the vote share
of the Italian Communist Party (historical predecessor
of the Democratic Left Party) peaked at 34.4% in
1976.
16 Perspectives on Politics
Article | Paper Stones Revisited
4 The label “Center-Right parties” is here used as
shorthand for “Center-Right and other parties.” This
category includes all parties that are not coded as
mainstream Left, radical Left, Greens or radical Right
(refer to online appendix 1).
5 Przeworski and Sprague’s view of unions as enablers of
the pursuit of supraclass electoral strategies by socialist
parties stands in marked contrast to the view advanced
by Kitschelt (1994). Influenced by the advances made
by Southern European socialist parties in the 1980s,
Kitschelt argues that strong unions represent a con-
straint on the ability of mainstream Left parties to
reposition themselves in response to new political
issues and cleavages.
6 Mainstream Left parties also held the office of Prime
Minister in Austria and Norway in 2008–2011 and
the association between union decline and vote-share
losses for mainstream Left parties fails to clear the 90%
significance threshold if these cases are also coded as
“incumbency during crisis.” Note that the Austrian
rate of unemployment actually fell while the Norwe-
gian rate increased very little during the crisis (from
2.5% in 2007 to 3.4% in 2011). These countries were
clearly less affected by the crisis than the UK, let alone
Iceland, Portugal, and Spain. Note also that the results
for Model 4 in table 2 are robust to dropping the
French case.
7 For European countries, the estimates the working-
class share of the electorate presented in online
appendix 2 are very similar to estimates derived from
the European Social Survey (see Rennwald 2015, 71).
By our definition, the share of workers in the total
electorate has declined since the 1970s, but not nearly
as much as the share of production workers. Averaging
across the five countries for which Rennwald (2015)
provides data, the share of production workers in the
total electorate fell from 33% to 19% while the share
of service workers rose from 12% to 20% from the first
half of the 1970s to the second half of the 2000s.
8 Nineteen of our forty CSES surveys include “not
eligible to vote” as a possible answer to the question
about voting in the previous election. In these cases, we
include first-time voters in the calculation of our
measure of the class profile of new voters for the
mainstream Left. In the other cases, the category of new
voters is restricted to the respondents who switched to
the party in the election that just occurred. Respondents
are coded as not having voted for themainstreamLeft in
the previous election if they declare that they voted for
another party or that they did not vote. Respondents
who did not answer the party choice or participation
questions have been dropped. The accuracy of
respondents’ recall of how they voted, especially their
recall of how they voted in the previous election (often
four or five years past), is an obvious concern that bears
on dependent variables and samples in the following
analyses as well as our operationalization of the class
profile of electoral mobilization by mainstream Left
parties. Correlations between our survey-based esti-
mates of the vote shares of Left parties and official
elections as reported by Armingeon et al. 2018 suggest
that this concern is not as serious as we expected when
we started this project. For vote shares in the current
election, the correlation is .963 (p , .001); for vote
share in the previous election, the correlation is .837
(p , .001); and for vote-share changes from the
previous election, the correlation is .774 (p , .001).
9 Refer to online appendix 4 for the formal notation of
our main model, interacting respondents’ social class
with the class profile of electoral mobilization by
mainstream Left parties. We obtain very similar results
when we estimate models with country dummies and
random effects at the country-election level (available
on request).
10 As the only Spanish election included in the CSES
database predates the crisis, and the British election of
2010 is not included in the CSES database, this
dummy controls for the extraordinary circumstances
of the Greek election of 2012 and the Icelandic
election of 2013.
11 Full regression results are presented in online appen-
dices 5 and 6. The class profile variable has been
centered at its mean value. The range varies depending
on the size of the sample (thirty-eight or forty
elections). The maximum value in figures 1a-1b
corresponds to 2.21 (Greece 2012 election) and the
maximum value in figure 2a– 2b corresponds to 1.76
(Finland 2011). The minimum value in both figures
corresponds to 0.79 (Switzerland 2011).
12 Dropping any one of the elections for which we have
thirty or thirty-one new voters for mainstream Left
parties (Finland 2007, 2011, 2015 and Iceland 2015),
in addition to Greece 2012 and Austria 2013, yields
results that are very similar to figures 2a–2b (available
upon request).
13 Refer to online appendices 7 and 8 for full regression
results and measures of statistical significance.
14 Note that the results presented here are based on
models that include age as a control variable. While
older voters are less likely to abandon the mainstream
Left, union members are not, on average, older than
non-members.
15 On the appeal of right-wing populist parties for
working-class voters, see Oesch 2008, Arzheimer 2013
and Afonso and Rennwald 2018.
16 In models of voting for the radical Left, we drop the
New Zealand election of 2014 as well as all Australian
and British elections; in models of voting for Greens,
we drop all Icelandic and British elections; and in
models of voting for the radical Right we drop the
17
Swedish election of 2002, the British election of 2005,
Australian elections of 2007 and 2013, as well as all
Icelandic, Irish, and Spanish elections. Literally no
mainstream Left leavers voted for these options in the
cases that have been dropped.
17 As shown in online appendix 10, the statistical
significance of the effects of pro-labor statements
improves when we estimate these models with stan-
dard errors clustered by country. Online appendix 11
presents the results of replicating the analysis with
measures of programmatic party positions from the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey: with a much reduced
number of observations, we still find a significant
positive association between pro-labor statements (as
reported by the CMP) and workers’ representation
among new voters.
18 See Tucker 2018 for a useful review of relevant
literature.
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